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The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law
Martha A. Field*
It is wonderful now to have a permanent Federal Courts
section; we owe thanks to Jack Beerman and Michael Wells and
others who helped bring this about. It seems to me the challenge
for this group is to find topics for discussion that are not too
convoluted. With federal courts, we are dealing with a field so
intellectually overdeveloped that it is almost impossible to have
an intelligible conversation about it. But it is wonderful to have
here a group dedicated to trying. And it is nice for us to have
the opportunity to come together and to see some faces behind
the names on those law review articles we're always reading.
I want to start by drawing a comparison between this issue
of the scope of federal common law and the more-often-dis-
cussed Tenth Amendment issue, most recently developed in the
National League of Cities1 and Garcia2 cases, concerning the
scope of congressional power to regulate the states. There the
question has been whether there is any separate area of activity
that only states can regulate - where only state law can ap-
ply - or whether instead, all subject matter areas may be sub-
ject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution or other expansive congressional powers. The
resolution, for the moment at least, is that there is no separate
area where only states can regulate, even though all agree that it
is important that there be areas where state law controls. Indeed
it is not an overstatement to say that the existence of such areas
is crucial to our federal system.
Instead of finding areas immune from congressional reach,
however, the Court, for the moment at least, has left the choice
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. This paper was delivered as a talk at the
AALS meeting in San Antonio, Federal Courts section, January 6, 1992, and as a com-
ment upon papers prepared by Professors George Brown and Thomas Merrill.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
2. Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The De-
mise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 884, 110-118 (1985).
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of where to legislate to Congress. It has suggested that the only
limit is that states must remain significant governmental units.
If Congress were effectively to eradicate the states, it would have
passed constitutionally-permissible limits, but up until that
point the choice of both how much and what to regulate rests
with the democratically-elected Congress, in which the states are
represented, and not with the Supreme Court.
Some charge that by deferring so much to Congress courts
violate separation of powers and federalism.3 The system does
give very broad power to Congress but relies on congressional
restraint. In theory Congress could take over almost everything
but it has in fact left vast areas where only state law controls.4
No outside watchdog has forced these limits on Congress; it has
limited itself.
There are some parallels behind that rather familiar topic
and our topic for today: whether there are limits on federal judi-
cial decisionmaking, and, if so, where they come from. Both are
characterized by an extremely broad power being bestowed upon
an institution as a theoretical matter, and they are both also
characterized by the exercise of great restraint.
In discussions of federal common law, as we've heard from
Professor Brown for example, alarms are often raised about how
far courts could go - alarms similar to those raised concerning
Congress's power unlimited by any Tenth Amendment re-
straints. But in the situation of federal common law as well, it is
important to recognize that the opportunity has not been pur-
sued. Courts have shied away from wielding the power that in
theory has been left to them. Just as Congress has not come
close to the outer limit of its potential reach under the com-
merce, spending, and taxing powers, to name but a few, so the
federal courts have been sparing in their forays into federal com-
mon law.
The real issue is not whether federal common law is all-en-
compassing, because all agree that it should not be. The real is-
sue is whether there should be a check from without on the judi-
ciary or whether the judiciary should police itself through
3. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1709 (1985).
4. For example, family law, real estate, licensing, and zoning to name a few.
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application of the doctrine of judicial restraint. One reason that
the outside parameters of the courts' power have not been well-
defined to date is that the Court has not come close to any limits
that exist - a point equally valid with respect to exercise 'of
Congress' power without judicial restriction in the form of Tenth
Amendment review.
But the particular question put to us today is whether the
creation of federal common law violates the separation of pow-
ers, and concerning that question my answer is a resounding no.
Indeed, I believe that making federal common law poses a more
serious threat to federalism than it does to separation of.powers;
it affects the federal-state balance more than the relationship
between the branches of the federal government.
Federal courts can make common law only where Congress
has not exercised its power to act; if a congressional enactment
exists, courts are bound to follow it. Federal court exercise of a
common law power cuts down on congressional power only if one
believes that congressional failure to act represents a congres-
sional judgment that no federal lawmaking should exist. That
judgment surely rarely describes the real significance of a con-
gressional failure to legislate in an area in its competence. 5
Moreover federal courts making federal common law attempt to
implement congressional intent, insofar as they can know it, and
if they err and make a federal common law rule that Congress
does not like, Congress can alter the rule by passing an enact-
ment clearly stating what it wants done.
States' power would be significantly more affected than
Congress's power by a broad exercise of judicial power to make
federal common law. Without judge-made law, where Congress
had not acted the consequence would be no federal law, and
usually state law would be free to operate. Federal common law
can compromise state lawmaking authority because federal
courts make law more easily, more readily, than Congress will, at
least in some situations. Indeed every instance in which a federal
court does exercise this power to make federal common law is by
definition one in which Congress has not acted, so therefore
every exercise of federal common law making power takes away
5. See generally HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (10th ed. 1958).
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from the powers of states.'
Although considerations of federalism are more relevant to
federal common law power than are concerns of separation of
powers, I don't believe federal common law violates either doc-
trine. Indeed, I don't think it violates any constitutional princi-
ple, as the ensuing discussion will explain.
In a minute I'm going to talk about separation of powers
and about federal common law on the merits, but first I want to
say something about the alternative title for this session, "The
New Erie Doctrine Revisited." I have problems with referring to
this question as "New Erie." The title may be a catchy, but it
obscures analysis rather than aiding it. It obscures analysis, first,
because "the doctrine" as I understand it has little to do with
Erie, and even more, because the label is being used to refer to
several quite different ideas or doctrines, each of which deserves
independent consideration. I will discuss the two problems in
turn.
My first problem with the "New Erie" label is that the
scope of federal law and its relation to the separation of powers
has very little to do with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins7 and the Erie
doctrine. To me the important aspect of Erie's holding is that
the same law is to apply in state and federal court, including
state-created common law. Erie said little or nothing about
which law applies in which forum, except to say that identity of
substantive law is the goal - including the identity of treat-
ment of common law. There is a separate question of which
law - state or federal - applies to which type of issue, a
question Erie does not answer. Erie's main contribution there is
to hold that the neither the Rules of Decision Act nor article III
gives federal courts power to create common law in ordinary di-
versity actions. But it does not enunciate general principles for
deciding when federal and when state law applies.8
This description of Erie contradicts Professor Brown's
6. This is not the case, however, if there would otherwise be federal preemption.
See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, (1978) (oil tanker design standards);
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (airport noise
regulation).
7. 305 U.S. 673 (1938).
8. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law., 99 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1986).
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description of the case as a limit on national power, an attempt
to give life to the Tenth Amendment. I do not see Erie that way
at all. Instead the main theme the opinion addresses is the need
for law to be the same in both fora - with the consequent re-
duction in forum-shopping that will accomplish.
My second objection to the use of the term "New Erie" is
that I can't figure out what it means. In trying, I have become
convinced that it is being used to refer to very different things.
This has it made difficult for me to fulfill my assignment of stat-
ing my position on "the New Erie doctrine," because I agree
with some ideas that are put forth as constituting "New Erie,"
while I strongly disagree with others.
Sometimes "New Erie" is taken to mean there is some sepa-
ration of powers aspect to concerns about federal common law,
in addition to an aspect of federalism. Thus viewed, the doctrine
stresses that courts should be more limited in lawmaking than
Congress is; they should not too readily make federal common
law, should not fill all gaps in congressional legislation, and
should not act to the limit of Congress's powers. I would not use
"New Erie" in this sense; Erie may have some relevance to the
issue, but surely the position is not "new." From the outset,
there was some separation of powers aspect to the Erie holding.'
And almost everyone agrees that courts should not feel free to
make federal common law up to the limit of Congress's powers; I
certainly do.
A different meaning often assigned to "New
Erie" - indeed I believe the most usual meaning - is a posi-
tion developed mostly by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in sev-
eral cases and most notably in Justice Powell's dissent in Can-
non v. University of Chicago'0 - a position that is potentially
highly restrictive of federal common law. In fact, if the position
were followed consistently, it would make almost all federal
common law illegitimate. Both because it is so restrictive and
because it emphasizes separation of powers instead of federalism
as a primary restraint upon federal common law, this Powell-
Rehnquist position is "new." It seems, however, to have little to
do with Erie. Moreover, this "New Erie" doctrine is one with
9. Id. at 905, 915-27, 933.
10. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J. dissenting).
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which I emphatically disagree, as I will explain later.
An additional, more workable variation is the same doctrine
but limited to implied federal remedies; federal common law
could persist but implied remedies are distinguished and are
never or almost never permissible. This is a plausible limitation
of the Powell-Rehnquist position, enunciated almost entirely in
cases dealing with implied remedies. Again, I would say the posi-
tion is new, has little to do with Erie, and has little to offer on
the merits.
A final and very different use of the "New Erie" terminol-
ogy is to refer to the idea of a "judicial prerogative." For exam-
ple, Professor Doernberg describes Professor Redish as a sup-
porter of "New Erie" based upon a quotation in which Redish
states that courts should not contradict congressional intent.11
Until I read Professor Merrill's paper, I thought everyone agreed
that courts cannot appropriately create federal common law in
derogation of congressional intent (unless the common law is
created to fulfill a constitutional mandate). 2 I myself do not ac-
cept any notion of judicial prerogative, as I will discuss later, but
have not thereby considered myself a supporter of "New Erie."
Instead of lumping together such an assortment of posi-
tions, as "New Erie" apparently does, it would be better to sort
them out and to employ a label that refers to the substance of
each. It would advance analysis if scholars would describe the
particular position they want to put forward or criticize and
would define its terms.
I had a related concern in reading Professor Brown's paper
and seeing his references to what liberals say and what conserva-
tives say. The assumption was that whatever one believes politi-
cally will control how she views these doctrines, and that one
will subscribe either to one set of positions or another. Yet one
criticism many of us have of the current Supreme Court is that
the Justices use these doctrines only instrumentally. As federal
courts scholars - certainly as followers of Hart & Wechsler
11. Donald Doernberg, Judicial Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 4 UTAH L.
REv. 759, 772 (1990).
12. The commentator who goes the furthest in endorsing federal common law and
the judiciary's right to create it is Louis Weinberg, in a very thoughtful and interesting
series of articles.
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with whom Professor Brown associates himself - we should ex-
pect persons to value federal courts doctrines at least partly for
their own sake, as great federal courts judges like Judge Friendly
and Justice Harlan have done. I myself agree with some of the
positions that Porfessor Brown labels as "what conservatives
think" and some he attributes to liberals, and I suspect that
many federal courts scholars, even if they consider themselves
clearly liberal or clearly conservative, would find themselves in
that position.
To return to the main question put to us today, I do not
believe that federal common law making violates the separation
of powers. Instead, I believe that attempts like Jusitces Powell's
and Rehnquist's to create rigid rules limiting federal common
law are fundamentally misguided. (You will note that of the sev-
eral "New Erie" doctrines described above, the one I am consid-
ering here, and the one that description probably most fre-
quently refers to, is the Powell-Rehnquist series of arguments
that making federal common law, or at least finding implied fed-
eral remedies, violates the separation of powers.)
But the issue is a complicated one, as is typical of federal
courts. I am going to give you two examples to think about as we
consider the question whether it is all right for a federal court to
make federal common law. One involves an implied right of ac-
tion and one does not.
The first is Cannon v. University of Chicago.13 The issue
was whether there was a private right of action for damages
under a federal statute outlawing sex discrimination in admis-
sions policies. The statute, Title IX, provided a procedure for
withdrawing federal funds from institutions that violated the
law, but the law did not spell out any private remedies.
The second example to consider does not involve implied
rights of action. This is significant because one of the subissues
in the federal common law debate is whether or not implied
rights of action are different from other federal common law.
The second example is judicial and executive immunities from
civil rights or constitutional tort actions. These would include
suits against state officers under section 1983, the Civil Rights
13. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
1992]
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Act, 14 and suits against federal officers under the Constitution,
which have been recognized at least since Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.1 5 In these
cases, use of federal common law has enabled courts to find
broad immunities from suits - especially suits for dam-
ages - although no enacted language suggests any such
immunities. 6
The Powell approach, first thoroughly set forth in Cannon,
suggests that it is not appropriate for courts to make federal
common law (or at least find implied federal remedies) unless
Congress specifically so intended. Courts should not infer causes
of action from a federal statute "absent the most compelling evi-
dence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist. '17
Justice Powell gives two reasons for saying that this pre-
sumption against federal common law is required by the doc-
trine of separation of powers. The first is the one argument that
applies only and peculiarly to federal remedies, or implied rights
of action, and not to other issues of federal common law: Powell
claims that courts' finding such remedies amounts to courts' ex-
panding their own jurisdiction, in violation of Article III of the
Constitution which reposes in Congress the power to delineate
the courts' jurisdiction.8 It is true that when a court finds that a
federal remedy exists (or even that a colorable argument is made
that one exists 9 ) that finding gives the federal courts jurisdic-
tion to hear the dispute, under the prevailing judicial interpreta-
tion of Congress' grant of federal question jurisdiction.20
Justice Powell's second argument is that making federal
common law more easily than he suggests amounts to judicial
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
15. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991); Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S.
731 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
17. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 718 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
18. Id. at 730-31, 745-47.
19. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 78 (1946).
20. An argument that federal common law should govern an aspect of the case other
than the cause of action or remedy, does not usually result in federal question jurisdic-
tion, even if the argument is correct, and even if the outcome of the case depends upon
it. See also Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 638, 687-694 (1981).
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usurpation of Congress's lawmaking functions. He speaks of the
courts as contradicting Congress's intent. But no Justice believes
that courts should create causes of action when Congress has de-
cided not to do so. The problem arises because Congress's enact-
ments are often silent concerning some questions, and it is not
at all clear just what Congress has decided with respect to them,
if it has thought about them at all. Justice Powell would
strongly presume against congressional intent to create a cause
of action; he would have state law - or no law - apply by
default.
The Cannon majority, by contrast, would allow courts a
third option as well: courts could apply a federal common law
rule - a rule of the judiciary's making - whenever that result
best fits with the policies behind congressional legislation. Judi-
cial lawmaking would be possible even if no evidence shows that
Congress adverted to the possibility of federal common law. This
approach might be described as a search for a "generalized"
rather than a "specific" congressional intent; it represents an ef-
fort to apply the rule most in accord with congressional intent
insofar as it is ascertainable, but courts are not precluded by
Congress's failure to advert to or resolve the problem at hand.2"
The range of choices available to judges in a no-federal-
common-law universe are familiar to constitutional law scholars
because of the jurisprudence of the commerce clause. There,
when federal legislation is not explicit about a governing rule,
courts have long undertaken to decide whether no law ap-
plies - Congress having "decided" to leave the area unregu-
lated - or whether instead states are free to apply their own
rules. It was early decided that when faced with a commerce
clause issue to which Congress had not spoken, courts would
choose between these two possibilities, and would make a choice
based upon all the circumstances, but would not exercise a third
alternative of itself creating the governing rule - that is, mak-
ing federal common law. Justice Powell's proposal seemingly is a
proposal to carry over the commerce clause approach to all con-
stitutional and statutory provisions. It leaves the courts faced
21. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983) (court's power to grant remedy
is "to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress");
Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-388 (1982).
1992]
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with a silent congressional enactment two choices - nonregula-
tion and state regulation - but not the third choice of creating
an appropriate federal rule.
If the Court had accepted Powell's position in Cannon, one
of two results would have followed: Either no damage action
could be found under Title IX unless and until Congress revised
the enactment; or instead state law would be applicable so that
it would determine whether or not a damage remedy, or any
other remedy, supplements the withdrawal of funds that federal
law provides. A finding that federal common law cannot or
should not be created in a particular instance does not resolve
all facets of the inquiry what law is to apply. When, for example,
a court passing on a federal enactment decides that a new fed-
eral remedy should not be created to supplement those specified
in the enactment, other questions remain concerning what law
applies: Can state remedies supplement the federal remedies ex-
pressly provided, especially if the federal remedies are narrow
and inadequate?2 2 It would be difficult to eliminate discretion on
this issue by adopting any hard and fast rule, and the Court has
never attempted to, relying instead on a "generalized intent" ap-
proach.2 3 Justice Powell's approach would, therefore, confine ju-
dicial discretion, but it would by no means eliminate it.
If, per contra, the legitimacy of federal common law is rec-
ognized, courts can consider as well the alternative of announc-
ing what the federal rule is - a rule they would derive from the
federal policy that is reflected in enacted law. They would opt
for a federal rule, rather than no law or state law, only if con-
22. There are other approaches as well as these two courses, and the choices that the
Court has made have depended on the context. The Court has sometimes prohibited
state remedies altogether, T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); it some-
times has found it optional with the states whether to provide any remedy, Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio RR., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); it has sometimes said that states must
provide a remedy but has left to the states what remedy to choose, Ward v. Love County,
253 U.S. 17 (1920); and it has sometimes placed federal limitations upon remedies that
states can provide, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Arguably, to be consistent, Powell should require judicial decisions on this issue
as well to be governed by a specific intent standard. If courts were so limited, a strong
presumption would have to be crafted either for preemption or for regulation by state
law, allowing judicial departure from the presumption only if Congress specifically so
intended. Any such standard applied across the board would produce some uncomforta-
ble results, which is one reason it has not been adopted. Instead courts decide which
approach is better under all circumstances.
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vinced it was most consonant with congressional intent that they
do so. In Cannon that means courts can find it most consistent
with Title IX that private litigants be permitted to enforce its
requirements; in the immunity cases it means courts can find
executive and judicial immunities despite the absence of any
mention of those immunities in enacted constitutional or statu-
tory law.
Of course, any formulation - specific intent, specific direc-
tive, generalized intent, or any other - can be applied gener-
ously or stingily, and the degree of presumption Powell would
create against federal common law - or implied federal reme-
dies - is not entirely clear. But there are indications that the
Powell position, especially as it has been developed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and others, not only erects a presumption
against federal common law but actually undercuts the legiti-
macy of all federal common law.
First, Justice Powell is ambiguous concerning what it is that
Congress must specifically have intended. The most sensible
construction is that Congress must specifically have intended
that courts should make federal common law, or define causes of
action to enforce the statute. But in some parts of Powell's opin-
ion he seems to go further, requiring also specific congressional
intent as to the content of the law. Must Congress have specifi-
cally intended the particular cause of action (or other common
law rule) that the court creates? If not, claims Justice Powell,
"the court's implication doctrine encourages . . political default
by Congress" and
"invites Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial
question whether a new regulatory statute should be employed
through private litigation. Rather than confronting the hard po-
litical choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its consti-
tutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide.
When this happens, the legislative process, with its public scru-
tiny and participation, has been bypassed, with attendant
prejudice to everyone concerned .... ,24
The problem with that approach is that it leaves no room for
federal common law; even when Congress affirmatively seeks to
24. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743.
1992l
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use the courts to fill out the contours of the statutory scheme, it
is prohibited from doing so. Courts can make no rules except
ones the Congress specifically intended and yet, for some reason,
did not spell out in the enactment.
True, Congress as the representative branch might be well-
advised to decide on remedies and other applicable issues itself,
rather than delegate the decision to the courts. Delegation
means that more policy-making will be made by the non-demo-
cratically selected judiciary. It is also probably true that more
federal law will result, because it is easier for Congress to enact a
law federalizing an area and telling the courts to devise the law
than it is for Congress to create the law itself. But any such ob-
jections are more properly directed to Congress than imposed
upon Congress by the Supreme Court. And not all agree with
Justice Powell that it is objectionable for Congress to utilize the
courts to formulate federal law. Judge Henry Friendly has de-
scribed Congress's ability to pass on these decisions as "one of
the beauties of' our system:
"[I]t permits overworked federal legislators, who must vote with
one eye on the clock and the other on the next election, so easily
to transfer a part of their load to federal judges, who have time
for reflection and freedom from fear as to tenure and are ready,
even eager, to resume their historic law-making function - with
Congress always able to set matters right if they go too far off the
desired beam.25
A specific intent prerequisite to federal common law should
relate to the authorization of judicial lawmaking and not to the
substance of the law to be made. To require specific intent (or a
directive) relating to the content of the law strikes out at the
very concept of federal common law. Surely one cannot force
Congress always to decide all issues in legislation. Surely it is
sometimes better to allow Congress to leave gaps in the legisla-
tion to be filled in by courts. Case-by-case development is some-
times the wisest choice; sometimes situations or even solutions
emerge that one could not foresee at the time of the legislation.26
25. Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 410 (1943).
26. Perhaps the issues of congressional endorsement of lawmaking and congressional
endorsement of the content of the rule have been confused because in the remedial con-
[Vol. 12:303
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Second, the approach - inaugurated in Justice Powell's
opinion in Cannon - developed further in later opinions and
moved toward a no-federal-common-law position. This develop-
ment has been detailed in other papers27 so I will review it here
only in the sketchiest fashion. In Carlson v. Green, Justice
Rehnquist in dissent adopted a stricter approach than specific
intent, saying that no federal common law should be found ab-
sent an explicit directive in the enactment.2 8 His comments were
limited to rights of action inferred from the Constitution, but in
Milwaukee v. Illinois the majority adopted the standard and ap-
plied it in the statutory context as well. Federal common law
should be found only when an enactment specifically so di-
rects.29 Earlier Supreme Court majorities had rejected such rigid
positions.30
Consistently applied, the Milwaukee v. Illinois approach
would bring an end to federal common law because Congress has
not often to date enacted explicit directives that courts should
create federal common law.31 (It has not enacted prohibitions ei-
text, the main context in which the strict rules are being suggested, the distinction is not
always apparent or important. It may be, for example, that Congress adverting to judi-
cially-created causes of action would correctly assume that damage actions were the form
that would be chosen. The distinction can be important, however, even in cases involving
remedies: Is it acceptable for Congress to enact a statute and decide that the full reme-
dial scheme is to be worked out by the judiciary? If Congress explicitly provides that the
judiciary shall decide upon the remedies, does the explicit directive obviate any constitu-
tional difficulties with the federal common law, or does such delegation itself raise issues
about the limits of federal common law? As my comments in text should make clear, I
believe that such a statute is constitutionally unassailable and that Congress should be
able to use judicial lawmaking when it desires to do so.
27. See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 11.
28. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
29. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
30. For example, in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., the Court,
through Chief Justice Burger, rejected the argument that state law applies "in absence of
an explicit congressional command to the contrary. 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973). Similarly, in
Bush v. Lucas, the Court rejected a requirement of explicit authorization. 462 U.S. 367,
375-76 (1983).
31. There are occasional examples of explicit congressional directives, however, such
as the mandate in rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that certain questions of
evidentiary privilege "shall be governed by the principles of common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." More-
over, Congress sometimes explicitly adopts state standards. See, e.g., Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1982); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1982); FED. R. EvID. 302, 601.
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ther, though if it did not want courts to act, such prohibitions
would be fully effective.) Unless Congress changes its ways and
affirmatively decides and states that courts should fill in the
contours of its legislation, a rule requiring an explicit directive in
order to make federal common law would result in no federal
common law being permissible.
Proponents of this approach avoid this result only by find-
ing exceptions - areas where their ban on federal common law
does not operate - for example if federal law preempts state
law; or when the federal rule can be called "interpretation"
rather than "federal common law."' 32 After the Court's anti-fed-
eral common law stance in Milwaukee v. Illinois, for example, it
used federal common law powers to create a cause of action that
Congress not only did not specifically intend but had even re-
peatedly and specifically rejected. The Court rationalized its re-
sult by making a preemption exception to the strict ban on fed-
eral common law.3 3 In other instances also, Justices who have
opposed judge-found causes of action occasionally themselves
find it necessary to create one and simply proceed without refer-
ence to their strict rules. For example, Justice Powell's opinion
for the Court in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,4
recognized an implicit federal common law right of Indians to
sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights and determined from
all the circumstances that Congress did not preempt or bar
those rights. Justice Powell has nowhere attempted to reconcile
his views in cases like Cannon and his views in cases like
Oneida.
One way to prevent the Powell-Rehnquist position from be-
coming the equivalent of a no-federal-common law rule would be
to limit it to remedies. After all, their approach has been crafted
in cases involving implication of federal causes of action, and
Powell has stated that courts should be most reluctant to create
federal common law in that area because it increases courts' ju-
32. See Field, supra note 9, at 931. Moreover, some believe that courts in any event
can provide federal remedies for federal rights, when they find that course appropriate.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-06 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
33. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
34. 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1251-59 (1985).
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risdiction.36 That argument is the only one, however, that gives
any basis for treating implied remedies differently from any
other federal common law issue, and the argument is a weak
one.3 6 Other Justices - Frankfurter and Harlan, for exam-
ple - have believed it easier to create federal remedies than to
make other types of federal common law. In short, while it
would be convenient to limit the Powell-Rehnquist-Milwaukee
v. Illinois approach to implied rights of action, there is little ba-
sis for separating that category of cases out from other federal
common law questions or for treating them more restrictively. In
both situations the problem is how the judiciary should act in
face of a congressional enactment that is silent on the issue
before them.
Unlike Justice Powell, I believe- that creating federal com-
mon law in an attempt to effectuate the generalized intent of
enacted law does not violate separation of powers. Indeed it is
more consonant with it than the rules that have been suggested
to limit federal common law. Federal common law should not be
seen as setting the various branches of the federal government at
odds with each other; the power conflict it raises is much more
between federal and state power, as described above.
The first reason federal common law does not violate the
separation of powers is that the whole purpose of federal com-
mon law is to effectuate the intent of enacted law and not to
countermand it. When courts make federal common law they
strive to carry out Congress's plan in the way most consonant
with congressional intent and policies, while recognizing that
congressional intent cannot always be known. Moreover, the rule
courts create operates only as an interim measure, to govern un-
til Congress acts and makes its choice explicit.3 8
35. Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 644-46 (1981);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 748-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
36. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
37. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-06 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring); Montana & Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Srv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
261-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Royal
Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296 (1941); Note, The Federal Common Law,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1528 (1969) (stating that specific congressional intent is needed to
support rights but not remedies).
38. The only exception is the very few cases where the Court is interpreting the
Constitution to require a federal common law rule, in which case it is more insulated
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Not only is the generalized intent approach designed to ful-
fill congressional intent, but the specific intent and other strict
rules of construction are often used in derogation of congres-
sional intent. While purporting to be rules of construction, often
they are used to fulfill purposes of the judiciary that Congress
does not share. They purport to limit judicial activism, but in
fact these rules allow courts to insist upon their own policies in
the face of apparently contrary congressional enactments.
One example is clear statement approach employed in The
Slaughter House Cases.39 There the Supreme Court in 1873 in-
terpreted the privileges and immunities clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment to have almost no meaning and then embarked
upon equally narrow definitions of the due process and equal
protection clauses. The Court's explanation for so underreading
the Fourteenth Amendment was that otherwise
"the effect is to fetter and degrade the state governments by sub-
jecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers
heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and
fundamental character. .. [and] radically changes the whole the-
ory of the relations of the state and the Federal governments to
each other and of both of these governments to the people.' 0
But it was precisely such expansion of federal power at the ex-
pense of state power that the Fourteenth Amendment contem-
plated - a fact the Supreme Court has since recognized.
Another example is the recent series of cases in which con-
gressional statutes purporting to let individuals sue states in
federal court have been "construed" not to allow suit. The Su-
preme Court has held the Eleventh Amendment a bar to federal
jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement of congressional
intent in the language of the statute itself. It is not the actual
congressional intent that the Court is attempting to find in those
cases; regardless of the clarity of congressional intent, the Court
will not hold federal causes of action applicable to suits against
states unless Congress in the legislation has employed the cor-
rect verbal formula.41 In both examples, the clear statement ap-
from congressional revision.
39. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
40. Id. at 78.
41. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Employees of the Dept. of
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proach was used as a judicial check - and represents judicial
activism more than restraint. Federal common lawmaking is not
judicial usurpation of congressional power but aims to fulfill
congressional intent not to transgress it. It represents an at-
tempt to cooperate with and work with Congress to would sensi-
ble federal policy.
Justice Powell's second argument concerning separation of
powers - that judicial discovery of federal remedies violates
separation of powers because it increases the jurisdiction of the
federal courts - is also a weak one, for Congress has nowhere
manifested an intention that federal courts exercise federal
question jurisdiction only when a federal remedy exists.4" Courts
have interpreted federal law to require a federal cause of action
for federal question jurisdiction, 4" an interpretation that reflects
substantial judicial restraint. If the judiciary has limited itself
with the remedy test for federal question jurisdiction, it is
hardly seizing jurisdiction of cases not intended for it when it
finds a federal remedy exists.
If, as I contend, federal common law contributes to congres-
sional-judicial cooperation, why does it have its detractors?
What are their concerns about federal common law?
The first fear concerning broad federal common law power
is that courts will find Congress allowed it when in fact Congress
did not and would not have intended a federal rule (or alterna-
tively, would not have intended the particular rule the court
adopted). As my defense of federal common law as fulfilling con-
gressional purposes should make clear, I do not accept the idea
of judicial prerogative that is discussed by Professor Merrill. My
reaction to his thesis is that of course federal common law must
be in accord with enacted law. I was surprised about the doubt
he expresses about my view, for I have consistently maintained
that the central requirement of federal common law is that it be
authorized by enacted law.""
Public Health and Welfare of Missouri v. Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mis-
souri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
42. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 943
(3rd. ed. 1988).
43. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
44. See Field, supra note 9, at 927-30. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Su-
preme Court cases are consistent with that approach, in reasoning as well as in holding.
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I find it hard to understand how Professor Merrill can both
support a requirement of an authorizing enactment and also
take seriously the notion of a judicial prerogative to act in dero-
gation of congressional intent, for it seems to me that the two
positions are not consistent with each other. There is a contra-
diction in the way Professor Merrill uses the term "judicial pre-
rogative" in his paper. At the beginning of the paper he talks
about a prerogative "to act according to discretion for the public
good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even
against it."'4 5 Later, however, Professor Merrill states that "even
if federal courts have inherent power to make law, presumably
they would not make law that contradicts existing enacted law."
I agree with the latter statement but do not understand how it
fits in with the former. It seems to me there is all the difference
between these two descriptions and it is important to maintain
the distinction between them. A judicial lawmaking - or filling
in of enacted law - in pursuance of congressional intent is a
very different creature than the same power used to circumvent
congressional intent. Moreover, in my view, the first of these ex-
ercises is wholly legitimate and the latter is utterly illegitimate.
But even though properly used federal common law may
fulfill congressional intent, those fearful of federal common law
point out that courts with power to make it also have power to
usurp authority that Congress did not and would not intend for
them. And a related fear is that courts will make too much fed-
eral common law; they will take over the decision whether fed-
eral law will displace state law and will sometimes go first with
the decision that federal law is to govern. This would cut down
While there are a few isolated cases that can serve as examples to the contrary, the same
three or four cases are always discussed to illustrate this tendency, while there are many
hundreds of cases that support this basic requirement for federal common law.
I also do not claim that all federal common law can be explained as "interpretation."
I do think that interpretation and federal common law are on a spectrum, and that it is
hard to know at what point to draw the line between them, so I would try to avoid
relying upon a test depending upon this distinction.
For example, a rule forbidding federal common law but allowing "interpretation"
might lead to some anomalous results. It might mean that it was not possible for courts
to create federal executive or judicial immunities but that could still create such immu-
nities for state officials; for state officials, the immunities could be seen as interpretation
of section 1983, while no such statute exists in relation to federal officials.
45. quoting LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 220 (Everyman ed. 1970)
(emphasis added in Merrill's paper).
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on the powers of the states vis a vis the federal government, as
we have seen. Moreover, the ideal of federalism, as explained in
both National League of Cities and Garcia, is that Con-
gress - and not the politically-insulated courts or any other
body - decides whether federal law should displace state law."6
One way of addressing these dangers that do lurk in judicial
common law power is to adopt strict rules concerning when it
can be made - like Powell's specific intent requirement or the
stricter explicit directive approach of Rehnquist in Carlson and
the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois. Such rules consistently fol-
lowed would cut back drastically on federal common law and re-
duce the opportunity for judicial usurpation. The problem, how-
ever, is that the cure would be far worse than the disease. The
rigid rules would prevent courts from creating federal common
law where it was not intended, but they would also prevent
courts from fulfilling judicial functions.
Much can be said for Congress making these decisions
rather than the courts, but the fact of the matter is that there
will always be issues involved in congressional legislation that
Congress does not think about and resolve. The judiciary often
may be the first body that has actually considered whether a
cause of action (or immunity or any other issue) exists in a par-
ticular situation; no one else may have adverted to the question
of the appropriateness of federal versus state law. Courts are less
suited than Congress to find facts, to deal with certain areas in a
systematic fashion, and to decide questions of policy. But we
should recognize as well the particular institutional advantages
that courts have in lawmaking and not jeopardize the benefits of
the judicial process in our endeavor to prevent excesses. Courts'
perspective of hindsight means they may become better ac-
quainted with the problems that actually arise under a federal
scheme. And surely they often can understand - in a way that
Congress, operating in the abstract, could not have - how a
particular congressional scheme impacts on the parties before
them. Moreover judges' detachment from the political process
may increase our confidence that reason and fairness will guide
their decisions. Because only the approach of judicial searching
46. For a fuller description of valid separation of powers and federalism concerns
about federal common law, see Field, supra note 9, at 930-34.
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for the framers' intent, in the sense of generalized intent, allows
the judiciary properly to perform its function, it is more conso-
nant with separation of powers than the rules strictly limiting
federal common law.
Supporters of an explicit directive requirement may believe
that it would force Congress actively to make the decision now
made by the judiciary - to think about whether state or fed-
eral law would best fill any gap, and to express itself on that
point. Congress is free to make the decision now, of course, but
it does not do so. The threat that otherwise state law must al-
ways apply - that no other body can address the issue and
come to the proper conclusion - is to make Congress change
its ways.
Even if one believes it appropriate to attempt to manipulate
Congress in this way, there is a substantial question whether a
different judicial approach really would produce a change in
congressional practice. And even if Congress did attempt to ad-
dress these issues, so that specific directives in favor of federal
(or state) law sometimes resulted, it seems inevitable that Con-
gress could not foresee all possible questions that would arise. If,
as I predict, a rigid rule limiting federal judicial creativ-
ity - such as those requiring specific intent or an explicit di-
rective - would create a need to add "other categories" where
federal courts can make federal common law more easily, then
judicial discretion would still control, but the whole controversy
over federal common law would have had the principal effect of
creating one more set of analytical hoops for litigants, courts and
scholars to jump through.
In this respect the attempt to create strict rules as to when
federal common law is authorized reminds me of the Tenth
Amendment issue with which we started. Just as in that context
courts have found over time that there is no way to set out a
separate sphere into which congressional regulation cannot in-
trude, so here there is no way satisfactorily limit court power
with a hard and fast rule. Because it is impossible to delineate a
clear rule that is satisfactory, it is best to leave the judiciary to
draw lines. It has done that to date by a presumption for state
law and a general policy of restraint. 7
47. See Field, supra note 9, at 950-62. Justice Harlan summed up the appropriate
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Because it is not possible to create effective, strict standards
for federal common law without displacing courts in their cen-
tral role, the real limits upon federal common law are forged by
judicial self restraint. Great Justices like Justice Harlan under-
stood that it is this policy that must hold the judiciary within
proper bounds and not any limitation from without. Justice
Harlan cared about protecting states' rights, but he did not em-
ploy rigid formulas in defining the bounds between state and
federal power. He employed this approach not only in this area
of federal common law and implied rights of action but also in
other areas. For example, he maintained that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause is violated by rules that vio-
late fundamental fairness or that shock the conscience, and he
avoided the more rigid formulas, such as the incorporation ap-
proach, that some Justices claimed would more effectively keep
the Court from writing its own preferences into the
Constitution. 8
The formulas Harlan used - such as fundamental fair-
ness - give great room for judicial leeway; they could only
achieve the purpose Harlan desired of them by the exercise of
judicial self-restraint. Harlan talked often of the importance of
such restraint but was prepared to rely upon the judiciary to
supply it. Indeed reliance upon judicial self restraint concerning
federal common law, as well as other subjects, is almost inevita-
ble, because judges are the decisionmaker to whom the argu-
ment for limits on the judiciary are addressed; they are the
guardians of the standard and have been ever since Marbury v.
Madison. 9
In one sense the argument for strict standards - whether
inquiry in Wallis v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68-69 (1966). He there sug-
gested that the first inquiry a judge should make in deciding whether to displace state
law with federal is whether state law poses "any significant threat to any identifiable
federal policy or interest." Only after it crosses this hurdle should the court proceed "to
consider other questions relevant to invoking federal common law, such as the strength
of the state interest in having its own rules govern, . . . the feasibility of creating a
judicial substitute . . . and other similar factors." This test creates a presumption for
state law, allowing the creation of federal common law only when there is an overriding
need for it.
48. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) for an example of the debate
between Justice Harlan and others, most notably Justice Black.
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the Powell or the Rehnquist version - is that the judiciary
should create a per se rule to limit itself. Perhaps the courts'
reply should be that if Congress wants to limit the courts to any
particular procedure or to take away judicial power in any class
of cases it can do so by statute, but in the absence of congres-
sional action the judiciary will leave the judicial function
unimpaired.5
Professor Merrill expresses great reluctance to rely upon ju-
dicial restraint, but I believe we should not feel uncomfortable
with this as a resting place. I do not understand his position,
especially since the standards he recommends ostensibly to limit
the judiciary - notably requiring that there be an implicit (not
explicit) directive as a precondition for federal common
law - are essentially equivalent to relying on judicial re-
straint. 1 In any case, judicial restraint seems to have worked so
far, causing federal common law to be made only sparingly. If
Professor Merrill finds this resolution objectionable, he should
tell us what rule he plans to substitute for judicial restraint that
will lead both to less discretion and to better results.
While I think he should frankly acknowledge and accept our
dependence upon judicial restraint in the proper delimitation of
federal common law, I agree with most of what Professor Merrill
says about the federal common law's limits, and I found his pa-
per very interesting and informative. Probably the biggest differ-
ence between us concerns how easily an enactment should be
construed to authorize the making of federal common law. The
issue is a difficult one. In fact I agree with Professor Merrill's
position that courts should not easily find federal common law,
but unlike him I am not ready to accept any rules to back up
that precept. Without such rules, the call for moderation
amounts to a call for judicial restraint. I believe we must neces-
50. Professor Redish argues that in the Rules of Decision Act the Congress has di-
rected federal courts not to make common law. Martin Redish, Federal Common Law,
Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective,
83 Nw. U. L. Rav. 761, 766,867 (1989). His construction of the RDA is, however, by no
means obvious. See Field, supra note 9, at 903-904. As I have explained thoroughly else-
where, Erie interprets the Rules of Decision Act to command that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction is not alone sufficient to support federal common law and that statutes
granting federal jurisdiction do not necessarily enable federal courts to make common
law. Id. at 922-23, 928-29.
51. See Field, supra note 9, at 941-42.
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sarily rest here because it is not possible to craft rules to restrict
courts that are both workable and set real limits. Certainly none
has yet been suggested. In this respect, this area is like the
Tenth Amendment issue that we started with: Congress should
not displace state lawmaking, but we have not found any good
rules to impose from the outside to limit Congress's power. With
both congressional and judicial lawmaking, it may be better for
Congress and the courts to limit themselves - at least for as
long as they continue to do so within reasonable bounds.
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